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ABSTRACT
INFANTS’ REASONING ABOUT AGENTS’ IDENTITY: THE CASE OF SOCIOMORAL
KINDS
SEPTEMBER 2016
HERNANDO TABORDA OSORIO, B.S., UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Erik W. Cheries, Ph.D.

Recent studies in development psychology suggest that early on infants are able to distinguish
characters who display a cooperative behavior from characters who display an antisocial
behavior. The current research builds on these findings and aims at determining the extent to
which infants possess the sociomoral distinction of “good” and “mean” agents. In particular, we
propose that infants represent sociomoral behaviors through kind-based categories. This
hypothesis was tested in the current research across 5 different experiments by investigating how
infants represent the identity of agents in sociomoral situations. Experiment 1 used a lookingtime paradigm to demonstrate 11-month-old infants’ bias to individuate distinct agents based
upon their “mean” and “nice” behaviors in a spatiotemporal ambiguous situation. Experiment 2
and 3 ruled out alternative explanations of this effect by controlling for the number of actions
presented and differences in motion, respectively. These findings suggest that infants expect
agents to display coherent sociomoral behaviors over time in a particular context. Experiment 4
tested whether infants’ are biased to identify prosocial agents more by their internal than their
external properties. Fourteen-month-olds showed a bias to identify the ‘helper’ character based
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on the color of its internal properties. Experiment 5 aimed to clarify whether infants have this
biased because they attribute a causal role to the agents’ internal properties. In two different
conditions the causal relevance of the agents’ internal or external property was manipulated. We
hypothesized that when the causal relevance of the internal property was undermined infants
would no longer be biased toward the agents’ internal properties when identifying it as the
“helper” character. So far, the results do not show a clear support for this hypothesis. Overall, the
results of all these experiments indicate that infants represent sociomoral behaviors in a
relatively categorical fashion, and more strongly associated to the agents’ internal rather than
external properties. These findings are discussed from both a strong version of kind-based
representations in terms of intrinsic natural kinds, and a weaker version in terms of more graded
and extrinsic sociomoral kinds.

Keywords: agents, development, infants, kind categories, sociomoral dispositions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During the last 30 years extensive research in infant cognition has unveiled some
key aspects about how infants keep track of an object’s identity over time. Indeed, a vast
literature suggests that object individuation abilities—judging if an object is the same or a
different instance of one seen before—seems to be a fundamental cognitive skill already
present in early stages of development (for reviews see, Carey & Xu, 2001; Xu, 2007).
For example, by as early as 2 months of age infants are able to determine if they are
observing one or two objects in an event based upon evidence that the objects occupy
distinct spatial locations across time (Aguiar & Baillergeon, 1999; Van de Walle, Carey
& Prevor, 2000; Xu & Carey, 1996).
The debate in infant cognition about whether behavioral performance reflects
mere perceptual abilities or both perceptual and high-level conceptual knowledge (e.g.,
Carey & Spelke, 1994) also arises in the literature on object individuation. Some research
advocates for a low-level interpretation of infants’ individuation abilities by invoking
automatic visuospatial attentional mechanisms (Scholl & Leslie, 1999), while other
researchers emphasize the early emergence of more conceptual-based mechanisms
(Carey & Xu, 2001). In order to better understand the mechanisms involved in the
process of object individuation researchers have examined the type of properties infants
use to individuate objects that belong to different ontological and taxonomical categories
(Baillargeon, Stavans, Wu, Gertner, Setoh, Kittredge, & Bernard, 2012). In this regard,
the ontological distinction between agents and non-agents has been one important domain
where both low- and high-level explanations have been empirically contrasted. For
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instance, 10-month-olds have been shown to individuate agents and inanimate objects,
but fail to individuate two perceptually dissimilar agents (Surian & Caldi, 2010),
suggesting that at least in some circumstances infants are able to recruit abstract
conceptual knowledge – such as a distinction between animates and inanimates—to keep
track of the objects’ identity over time
In addition to looking at how infants individuate agents from non-agents, recent
research has examined the influence of conceptual knowledge in representing the identity
of individual agents. In particular, previous studies with older children have shown that
intuitive biological knowledge constrains the way they represent the identity of living
beings. For example, 7-year-old children believe that an animals’ internal properties are
more likely than external properties to determine their categorical membership (e.g.
whether it is a cat or a dog; Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989) as well as their individual identity
to the extent that each individual is represented as belonging to only one immutable
category (Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996). A similar reasoning bias about the relative
importance of internal and external properties in the representation of agents’ identity has
been shown in infants. When 13-month-olds observe a transparent object with contrasting
internal and external properties they tend to use the color of internal properties as a more
reliable cue of identity than its external properties (Taborda-Osorio & Cheries, 2015).
This result suggests that from early on domain-specific biological knowledge seems to
constrain the way infants reason about agent identity.
The current set of proposed studies further explores the unique ways in which
infants represent the identity of agents. Although using internal properties could be
relevant when reasoning about animals embedded in taxonomical categories (Atran,
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1998; 1999), adults tend to use psychological characteristics as a better indicator of
people’s identity (Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). Among all psychological
characteristics that people use, sociomoral dispositions is one of the most elemental ways
that even preschool-aged children use to distinguish people, and it is relevant when
representing peoples’ identity. For example, children use labels like “mean” and “nice” to
refer to people and to infer their future behaviors, mental states and emotions (Heyman &
Gelman, 1998). Children’s explanations about the source of these properties transitions
from an early belief that being “mean” or “nice” is attributed to one’s nature to a point
where nurture is viewed as the main source of one’s sociomoral attributes (Heyman &
Gelman, 2000). This pattern of results with children has led some researchers to suggest
that children represent sociomoral categories like intrinsic and essentialized attributes,
meaning that they are immutable over time, and independent from external features and
peoples’ beliefs. In other words, being mean or nice is represented like an essential
psychological attribute that defines people’s identity to some extent. This type of intrinsic
and essentialized category is referred in the psychological literature as a kind concept.
Previous developmental studies have demonstrated that as early as 6 months of
age infants are able to distinguish agents based on their sociomoral dispositions, such as
“mean” and “nice” or “helper” and “hinderer” (for a review see Hamlin, 2013). The main
goal of the current set of studies is to determine to which extent infants represent those
sociomoral dispositions like kind concepts, and hence like an identity-determining
attribute of some agentive entities. The main motivation of studying infants is to give
some insight into the developmental origins of moral concepts. In concrete terms, we
want to test infants between 11 and 14 months of age because this is the age range at
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which language production starts. This is crucial because unlike concepts in other
domains (e.g. natural kinds) social categories appear to be strongly influenced by cultural
factors and language. Therefore, demonstrating that moral categories are represented like
kind concepts at the onset of language acquisition would suggest the presence of abstract
initial underpinnings that may guide subsequent learning of moral knowledge.
The current proposal is divided into five sections. First, the literature review,
where the concepts of “agent”, “kind concepts” and “social kinds” are further developed.
Second, the overall description of the current research. In the third and fourth sections
Study 1, “Individuation of Agents by Moral Dispositions” and Study 2, “Insides and
Moral Dispositions” are presented. Finally, in the last section some preliminary
conclusions will be presented.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The Concept of “Agency” in Infancy
For adults, the conceptual distinction between agents and non-agents relies mostly
on the attribution of mental states, such as ascribing goals and dispositions to agentive
entities in order to explain their behavior. On the other hand, the use of pure mechanical
laws seems to be enough to explain the behavior of non-agentive, or inanimate, entities
(Carey, 2009). Children’s understanding of this ontological difference emerges very early
on in life. For example, 5-month-old infants know that inert objects move together if and
only if they touch (principle of contact), however, they also believe that human action is
not constrained by this principle and are not surprised if they witness two human-like
shapes moving without contacting each other (Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995).
Likewise, 5-month-old infants also expect that inert objects but not people follow a
continuous spatiotemporal path when moving across the stage (Kuhlmeier, Bloom &
Wynn, 2004). Possibly, they believe that humans are somehow special entities that do not
necessarily follow the same physical rules of inanimate objects. Other studies have also
demonstrated that the conceptual distinction between agents and inanimate objects has
consequences in the way infants categorize (Mandler, 2004) and individuate objects
(Surian & Caldi, 2010).
This initial distinction between agents and non-agents leads to the following
important question about the infants’ understanding of agents: What type of properties do
infants use to identify agents as different from non-agents? There are two classic answers
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to this question in the developmental literature. The first claims that the presence of
featural cues resembling a human being are necessary for identifying agents. The second
claims that exhibiting certain motion cues, such as self-propelled behavior, is enough to
trigger a representation of agency.
Woodward has been probably the most influential advocate for the first answer, in
a seminal study, Woodmard (1998) tested 9-month-old infants’ ability to encode actions
like goal-oriented behaviors in two different conditions; infants were either habituated to
repeated presentations of a hand reaching one of two objects placed on a stage or they
witnessed a rod touching one of the same two objects. Then, the objects’ positions were
switched to see if infants at this age expect the hand and the rod to be oriented towards
the same object, regardless of its current position or if they expect to see them following
the same spatiotemporal trajectory. The results of this study revealed that infants who
participated in the hand condition expected reaching towards the same object, whereas
infants in the rod condition were relatively insensitive to the object and instead reacted to
the rod changing its spatiotemporal trajectory on the stage. Subsequent studies using eye
tracking demonstrated that infants not only are surprised when the hand reaches a
different object but they also actively anticipate the hand’s motion once the objects
switch places (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Woodward & Cannon, 2013). Infants have
also been shown to be able to use other human typical cues in addition to hands to infer
intentionality, such as peoples’ looking and pointing (Johnson, Slaughter & Carey, 1998;
Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007).
According to Woodward (2009), these studies suggest that the infants’ daily
experience with hands reaching towards objects in a goal-oriented fashion may support
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their ability to understand that hand-shaped objects but not rods or other inanimate
objects display agentive behavior. Additional support for this hypothesis comes from
Guajardo and Woodward (2004) where 7- and 9-month-old infants were shown the same
experimental setup as in Woodward (1998) but the hands’ surface properties were
obscured by a glove, resulting in the infants’ inability to interpret hands’ motion as goaloriented behavior. Woodward (2009) also argues that the infants’ own experience with
reaching behaviors rather than the observation of others engaged in reaching actions is
the main source of their goal attribution abilities. For instance, 3-month-old infants who
typically fail to interpret another person’s hand movements as goal-oriented will do so
successfully after they have been outfitted with Velcro-covered mittens that allow them
to experience “grabbing” objects for themselves.
The second classic answer to the question of how infants identify agents was
proposed by Premack. In his classic paper Premack (1990) proposed that self-propelled
motion is the main cue by which infants distinguish agents from non-agents, in such a
way that whenever an object displays self-propelled motion infants are predisposed to
interpret intentional movements. This theory, however, has not received good empirical
support. For example, in a study carried out by Csibra (2008), 6-month-old infants
observed an inanimate object (a box) displaying self-propelled motion on a computer
generated 3D stage. The box moved around an obstacle to reach a target in two different
conditions: the box reached its target displaying either the same path across trials (single
route condition) or different paths (variable route condition). The results of this
experiment revealed that infants this age infer agency only in the variable condition and
do not seem to treat self-propelled motion as a critical component for identifying agents.
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Shimizu and Johnson (2004), and Luo and Baillargeon (2005) discovered other
behavioral cues that when present in the experimental setup are enough to trigger the
inference of agency. In these studies, infants observed an inanimate object engage in a
choice task that resembles the original Woodward (1998) procedure. These researchers
discovered that variables such as the presence of more than one object on the stage in a
choice situation, and cues of attentional orientation (the box “looking” sequentially to
both objects) are important for the attribution of agency.
The results of the previous studies are also in line with some theories that propose
an early emergence of a conceptual distinction between mechanical agency and
intentional agency (Carey, 2009; Leslie, 1994). For example, Leslie (1994) proposed that
a domain-specific mechanism (ToBy) is devoted to analyze an object’s physical and
mechanical properties. As part of this analysis, the system uses the cue of self-propelled
movement to represent an agent like an object with internal and renewable sources of
energy. Therefore, this notion of agency is purely physical and has nothing to do with
intentional behavior. As evidence for the concept of mechanical agency in the infants’
mind, Leslie (1994) notices that when infants are exposed to videos of launching events
(a ball hitting other ball) they assign different roles to the object that causes the motion
and the object that receives the motion (agent and non-agent). Thus, when infants observe
the same video played backwards they find it strange that the object that previously
caused the motion is now the recipient of the movement (Leslie, 1988). According to
Leslie (1994), the understanding of these launching events involves the distinction of
agents and non-agents in mechanical terms, without referring to psychological constructs
to make sense of objects’ motion.
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Although the previous studies present substantial evidence against the hypothesis
that self-propulsion is a necessary cue for intentional agency, these same studies also
seem to call into question the experience and featural account of agency proposed by
Woodward insofar as in all these cases infants attribute agency to inanimate objects.
Infants seem not to struggle with attributing goals to boxes on the stage. This suggests
that neither self-propulsion nor featural information alone is necessary for infants to
identify agents. Therefore, some researchers (Csibra and Gergely, 1998; Biro and Leslie,
2007; Baillargeon, Wu, Yuan, Li, & Luo, 2009; Biro, Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Luo and
Choi, 2013) have proposed that the identification of agents is rooted in a specialized
system of psychological reasoning that makes use of patterns of object behavior that
gives evidence of internal control and perception of the environment. In other words, the
object should appear as being context-sensitive and possessing free will.
Csibra and Gergely (1998), and Gergely and Csibra (2003) also point out that the
representation of internal control not only depends on the perception of the agent’s
behavior itself but also on the perception of the physical context and the end state of that
behavior. According to these authors, the representation of agency emerges only when all
these three variables satisfy the principle of rational action, meaning that the object’s
behavior should be perceived like efficient in attaining an end state (or goal) under the
restrictions of the current physical context. Efficiency may be judged as the most direct
or the least effortful action to attain a goal. Evidence for this theory comes from several
studies where infants are shown inanimate objects displaying either a rational or an
irrational action on the stage (Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003; Csibra & Gergely,
2007; Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, Brockbank, 1999). For example, in the classic study
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of Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra and Biro (1995), 12-month-old infants were shown an
inanimate object (a ball) jumping over a barrier to reach a target (another ball), when in
the test trials infants were shown the same scenario without the barrier, they expected the
object to follow a straight trajectory to reach the target rather than the previous curve
trajectory. Authors interpreted these results as demonstrating that infants are able to
analyze the agents’ behavior (the curved trajectory), the physical constraint (the barrier)
and the end state (reach the target) together to infer what the most rational or efficient
action the agent will display in the future. Subsequent studies demonstrated that infants
are also able to use this tripartite representation in a productive way. For instance, infants
are able to infer the agent’s goal by taking into account the agent’s behavior and the
perceived physical constrains (Csibra, et. al., 2003).
Even though agentive entities have been distinguished from non-agentive entities
based only on the attribution of mental states, it is unclear whether or not infants also
attribute biological properties to agentive entities. Some researchers (Mandler, 2004;
Carey, 1994) have provided a negative answer to this question by arguing that biological
knowledge is the result of conceptual change along development. For instance, Carey
(1994) proposes that only around 10 years of age do children display a biological
understanding of typical biological process such as growth and respiration in terms of
internal physiological mechanisms. Other researchers, however, have called into question
this conclusion and have suggested that some rudimentary biological knowledge may be
in place as early as in the first year of life (Gelman, 1990). Recent work has addressed
this by testing whether or not 8-month-old infants attribute biological properties to
agentive entities (Setoh, Wu, Baillargeon and Gelman (2013). Specifically, they tested
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whether infants believe that self-propelled and agentive objects have something inside
that could be responsible for the agent’s motion. Setoh et. al (2013) tested this hypothesis
by presenting objects on the stage in three different conditions across experiments: in the
first condition the object was self-propelled and agentive, displaying features such as fur
or contingent reaction, in the other two conditions objects displayed only one of the two
properties alternatively. Once infants were familiarized to the object’s motion on the
stage the experimenter lifted the object showing it either filled or empty. The pattern of
results revealed that infants expected the object to be filled only in the first condition
when they had witnessed a self-propelled and agentive object. This study suggests first
that from very early on infants distinguish biological agents from non-biological agents in
terms of the presence of internal properties, and second that both self-propulsion and the
display of agentive features (such as eyes or fur) seem to be necessary cues for the
representation of biological agents.
In summary, infants seem to possess several specialized systems for representing
and reasoning about agents. An innate physical system allows them to represent agents as
possessing an internal source of energy, by detecting self-propelled motion as the main
cue of agency. A psychological system allows infants to represent agents with intentional
states, such as goals and dispositions, as a means to explain their behavior. Infants are
able to use both featural information and patterns of behavior indicating contextsensitivity as the main cues of psychological agency. Finally, recent evidence suggest that
infants may possess a biological reasoning system that allows them to represent some
agents as having internal biological properties. The distinction between biological and
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non-biological agents seems to rely on the simultaneous perception of self-propelled
motion and agentive featural cues.

2.2. Kind Concepts
A great deal of work in the literature on kind concepts has focused its attention on
how people represent and reason about natural kinds, including mainly animals and
chemical compounds such as gold and water (Estes, 2003; Malt, 1994; Rips, 2011). A
natural kind concept refers to a complex representational structure where multiple items
are grouped together based on a non-obvious similarity, or essential property (Kripke,
1980; Putnam, 1975; Quine, 1969). In contrast to human made objects, natural kinds are
supposed to be objective and intrinsic categories (Rips, 2011), meaning that what the
essential property is does not depend on either human beliefs or the interactions with
other objects in the world. Therefore, natural kinds are ahistorical categories which
essence should be discovered through scientific research. Some philosophers and
scientists have called into question both the search for essential properties as the main
goal of a scientific enterprise and the existence itself of real essences in the world
(Ereshefsky, 2010; Wilson, Barker & Brigandt, 2007). However, an essence is not
necessarily something real, but rather an assumed property of some objects that may
determine the referent of a word and serve to represent the ultimate cause of a pattern of
observed correlations in an entity.
Although there has been some debate about whether or not people conceptualize
the essential and hidden properties of a category as the main referent of a word (Braisby,
Franks & Hampton, 1996; Malt, 1994), some evidence indicates that this may be the case
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(Haukioja, 2014; Jylkka, 2008). For example, when adults are told a fictitious story
where it has been discovered that the real chemical composition of water is XYZ rather
than H2O, people tend to consider that what has been called water so far is not water any
more but some other thing, despite having the same observable properties (Jylkka, Railo
& Haukioja, 2009). Therefore, people seem to believe that the referent of a word depends
on an external non-obvious property.
Similar to word definitions, there has been some debate about the causal
understanding of essential properties. Some researchers deny that this could be the case
insofar as people normally lack any specific knowledge about what the essential property
of a category is (Strevens, 2000). However, in a classic paper Medin and Ortony (1989)
propose that peoples’ knowledge about those essential properties can be reduced to an
overall assumption without specific content. Hence, in their model the essential property
plays the role of a causal placeholder in the peoples’ representation of natural kinds.
The assumed sharing of an essential property with causal potency across
individuals in the same kind category allows people to engage in high order reasoning in
different cognitive tasks, such as when categorizing objects (Medin & Ortony, 1989),
keeping track of individuals over time (Wiggins, 1980), and making inductive inferences
(Rips, 2004). Thus, people tend to outweigh hidden properties over observable features
when categorizing animals. For example, people categorize mice and whales in the same
group as mammals, although they look very different (Sloman, 2005). People also know
that object identity can be preserved across some changes in external properties (e.g. a
mouse changing color), but they are more reluctant to accept that object identity is
preserved across a transformation in category membership (e.g. a mouse changing into a
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whale without evidence of spatiotemporal continuity). In other words, categorical
membership is represented as more central to the individual identity than superficial
features (Hirsch, 1982). Additionally, knowing the category membership of an animal
allows people to generalize properties to other animals in the same category. For
instance, people readily transfer the property “warm blood” from a mouse to a whale but
not from a mouse to a salmon. All three types of reasoning about natural kinds –
categorization, individuation, and inductive inference- are closely related each other and
depend on the assumption of a hidden essential property, in such a way that the
possession of that essence determines both the categorical and the individual identity.
The process of categorization of natural kinds has been one of the most fertile
grounds in psychology for exploring the hypothesis of essentialized categories. In a
seminal study, Ahn (1998) discovered the causal status effect in categorization tasks
where causal features are more important to category membership than less causal or
effect features. For example, people consider that the feature wings in a bird is more
important than the feature fly because flying is the consequence of having wings (Ahn,
Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohesnstein and Kalish, 2000; Ahn, Kalish, Gelman, Medin,
Luhmann, Atran, Coley & Shafto, 2001; Ahn, Kim, Lassaline & Dennis, 2000; Kim &
Ahn, 2002). According to Ahn et al., (2000), this effect explains why the assumption of
an essential property as the original cause is more important in categorization than visible
properties. Building on these results and other similar effects of causal knowledge,
Rehder (2003), Rehder and Kim (2009), and Hayes and Rehder (2012) propose that
categorization of natural kinds is a two-step process of diagnostic reasoning. The first
step is to infer the presence of an unobservable feature from observable features, and the
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second step is to determine the category membership from the unobservable features. In
support of this theory, Rehder and Kim (2009) found that people assess visible features as
more diagnostic of category membership when they are causally connected to
unobservable features than when they do not. For example, participants were told that in
Kehoe ants, blood high in iron sulfate (the underlying feature) was responsible for
hyperactive immune system (observable features), while in Argentine ants, blood high in
metallic sodium was merely correlated with fast digestion. When an animal exhibits both
observable features people tended to categorize it as a Kehoe ant, presumably because the
hyperactive immune system is a reliably diagnostic feature of a causal underlying
property. These studies demonstrate that the assumption of an essential property is not
just a way of representing the referent of natural kind concepts, but also has real
implications in the way people reason about the world.
Several authors have suggested that the assumption of essentialized categories is
proper only of natural kinds (Malt & Sloman, 2007; Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Malt,
2003). However, a growing body of research indicates that people may represent artifacts
and diverse social categories in a similar fashion as natural kinds. In the case of artifacts,
several authors (Bloom, 1996, 1998; Keil, Greif & Kerner, 2007; Matan & Carey, 2001;
Rips, 1989) have suggested that similarly to biological entities artifacts such as chairs and
boats are represented as entities that successfully express the intention of a designer to
create a member of a particular artifact kind in a historical setting. Thereby, the way
people differentiate the concept boat from the concept chair is by referring to the
designer’s intention to create an object that belongs to either the category of chairs or the
category of boats. In this regard, the designer’s intention is a non-obvious property that
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groups together potentially dissimilar objects. Although function is an important property
to represent artifacts, it is not an individuating factor because it is neither sufficient nor
necessary to differentiate artifacts. For instance, people judge an object with a typical
appearance of a boat but used like an off-shore jail to be a boat (Malt & Johnson, 1992),
presumably because having the typical appearance of a boat indicates that the original
creator’s intention was to design a bout and not an off-shore jail. Evidence for the “design
stance” of artifact categories has been found in different cultural contexts (Barrett,
Laurence & Margolis, 2008).
Like biological and artifact kinds, it has been demonstrated that social categories
are represented around a core of non-obvious properties responsible for the categorical
identity of members in those categories (Haslam, 1998; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Haslam,
Rothschild & Ernst, 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2006; Prentice & Miller, 2007). For
example, people tend to represent some social categories (e.g. gender) like highly
uniform, discrete, immutable and objective. It has also been shown that adults represent
some personality traits (e.g. intelligence, talkative and creative) as deep psychological
characteristics, relatively immutable and highly informative about future people’s
behaviors, emotions and other mental states (Gelman, 2003; Haslam, Bastian & Bissett,
2004).
In a recent study, Ahn, Taylor, Kato, Marsh & Bloom (2013), demonstrated that
people do not just represent the hidden essential properties as central in the structure of
kind concepts, but also assume that they should be causally responsible for the observable
properties. In one experiment adults were asked to rate how likely different members in
four different types of categories –living things, artifacts, mental illness and medical
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disorder- may share something that causes the typical features display in those members.
When categories were named like kinds (e.g. by indicating that an instance belongs to a
superordinate kind) participants tended to attribute a common cause, but when they were
named like arbitrary groups participants were significantly less likely to attribute a
common cause. This study demonstrates first a causal connection between a non-obvious
property and visible properties in people’s representation of kinds, and second that this
representation seems to be common for all objects that are described as members of a
kind, regardless the specific category.
Other studies found support for the hypothesis of a common representational
structure of kind concepts by showing differences in the way people reason about kinds
and non-kinds (Prasada, Hennefield, and Otap, 2012; Rips, 1989). In this line of research,
Prasada, et, al. (2012) propose the “Distinct Representation Hypothesis”, according to
which the human conceptual system has two different ways to represent categories: kind
representations and class representations. Kinds are understood to be intrinsically general,
and supporting kind specifications where a category as a whole is represented as a
member of a superordinate category. Thereby, a kind is represented as a specific way to
realize the superordinate category. For example, a “dog” is a kind of animal, and a
“sailboat” is a kind of boat. By contrast, a class representation is an arbitrary category
where the group as a whole is not represented as a member of a superordinate category.
Thus, “white bears” is not a kind of bear, and “blue buses” is not a kind of vehicle.
Even though it is possible to outline several similarities across different kind
categories that suggest a common representational structure, some researchers point out
important differences between people’s representation of natural kinds and other kind
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categories (Estes, 2003; Kalish, 1995, 2002). The most notable difference is that artifacts
and social categories are not as essentialized as natural kinds. Thus, adults believe that
animals of the same species share a real essence inside each exemplar, render them more
resistant to changes in external appearance in categorization judgements. A radical
example of this believe is the “genetic essentialism”, according to which genes strongly
determine the kind membership of an animal (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). By contrast,
artifacts seem to be devoid of internal essences (e.g. nothing inside a hammer makes it
the artifact it is), and are more conventionalized. As a consequence, membership in a
natural kind is absolute (i.e. all or none), while membership in an artifact kind tend to be
more graded (Estes, 2003). Similarly, some studies carried out by Haslam and colleagues
demonstrate that not all social categories are equally essentialized (Haslam, et. al., 2000).
Some of them (e.g. gender, race, and age) are represented like natural kinds or pseudonatural kinds (Boyer, 1993), while others (e.g. politic affiliation and religion) are
represented as possessing an underlying reality but less immutable over time.
A second important difference in category structure is that observable features are
not equally diagnostic of category membership across different kinds. Thus, some studies
conducted by Keil (1995) demonstrate that the perceived importance of properties in
categorization judgements varies as a function of the type of kind. For example, changes
in color are very important for categorizing chemical compounds but not for artifacts and
living things, while changes in shape shows the reverse pattern. These results indicate
that the relationship between observable and unobservable properties is not a simple one,
and it may be supported by abstract theoretical beliefs about how properties in different
conceptual domains are interconnected each other.
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In summary, the representation of kind concepts in adults exhibits both unity and
diversity. Unity in their basic organization where non-obvious properties are represented
as causal-explanatory features, and in the role that kinds play in the human inferential
system, supporting categorization, individuation and inductive generalizations. Diversity
in domain-specific differences regarding the type of visible properties that are more
diagnostic of membership, and in the degree that those categories are essentialized. Thus,
for natural kinds the essential property is projected as part of the object’s internal
structure, while for artifacts the essential property is extrinsic and ultimately relies on the
creator’s mind. The questions to address now have to do with how this type of
representation originates and develops over time. Although considerable progress has
been made in how children understand several classes of natural kind concepts, the next
section will focus mostly on children’s understanding of biological concepts and artifacts.

2.3. Development of Sociomoral Concepts
Like biological kinds, children have been shown to essentialize social categories
(Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Eliyahu & Diesendruck, 2010). Thus, Hirschfeld (1995, 1996)
demonstrated that children as young as 4 years of age represent race as a more identity
relevant property than other biological properties (e.g. body build). They also believe that
racial identity is inherited from parents to children and maintain throughout life
regardless the cultural context were the child is raised. For example, using a “switched at
birth” task, children were told a story about two racially different couples who
accidentally change their babies at birth. Then, they were shown two pictures of two
school-age children, one black and the other white, and asked to choose which the correct
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couple’s baby was years later. Results show that 4 and 5-year-olds tend to choose based
on racial correspondence, meaning that they represent race as an essential property
transmitted through biological mechanisms (e.g. birth).
Similar conclusions have been reached with other social categories. Using the
switched at birth task, Taylor (1996), and Taylor, Rhodes and Gelman (2009),
demonstrated that until 9-10 years of age children hold the belief that genderstereotypical properties are inherited and biologically transmitted. Following the studies
of Gil-White (2001) about ethnicity with Mongolian communities, Birnbaum, et al.
(2010) showed that Israeli children essentialize ethnic categories (e.g. Arabic and Jewish)
by using inductive potential tasks. For example, when children are told that two different
people share the same ethnic membership, they generalize psychological properties
across both members. These results indicate that Israeli children represent ethnicity as a
deep causal-explanatory feature. Language is another social category that has also been
shown to trigger essentialist beliefs in children. Thus, Kinzler and Dautel (2012)
demonstrated that 5-6-year-old children believe that the type of language (e.g. French or
English) spoken by a person but not race will remain stable throughout her lifespan.
Hence, language is represented as an identity determining feature immune to changes in
the surrounding cultural context. Previous experiments using the switched at birth task
with language as category membership support this conclusion (Hirschfeld & Gelman,
1997).
In addition to social categories, some studies have explored the children’s
understanding of personality traits (Gelman, Heyman & Legare, 2007; Yuill, 1992,
1998). Thus, it has been shown that personality traits like “mean” and “nice” have rich
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inductive potential (Heyman & Gelman, 1999). For example, even 3-year-old children
are able to predict that nice people will display a more cooperative behavior than mean
people (Heyman & Gelman, 1998), and that two people described like nice or mean will
share some preferences regardless their physical appearance (Heyman & Gelman, 2000a).
However, children do not seem to believe that personality traits are innate (Heyman &
Gelman, 2000b), and when pitted against each other social categories have been shown to
have more inductive potential than personality traits for children (Diesendruck & haLevi,
2006).
The children’s conceptual status of human kinds regarding natural and artifact
kinds has been widely debated. In his original formulation of racial representations,
Hirschfeld (1996) proposed that human kinds resemble natural kinds in terms of being
objective and intrinsic. A similar formulation was put forward by Gil-White (2001),
arguing that ethnic categorizations make use of an innate module for reasoning about
biological entities. However, more recent studies call into question the objective nature of
children’ social representations and overall their similarity to biological categories
(Cosmides, Tooby & Kurzban, 2003). Thus, Diesendruck and Eldror (2011), and
Diesendruck and Weiss (2015) demonstrated that children represent internal
psychological properties but not internal biological properties (e.g. the insides) as
definitional of social membership. In other words, people who belong to the same gender,
ethnic or racial group are represented as sharing beliefs but not necessarily internal
biological mechanisms. Also, Rhodes and Gelman (2009), and Diesendruck, GoldfeinElbaz, Rhodes, Gelman & Neumark (2013) tested the children’s beliefs about the
objectivity of different social categories, compared to artifacts and biological kinds by
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asking children whether they agree or disagree with alternative categorizations (e.g. a
woman being categorize like a man). Overall, they found that the young children’s
resistance to re-categorize people varies as a function of the type of social category,
among other factors. Thus, gender was highly resistant to change, while ethnicity and
race were more variable, and new social categories (e.g. shirt-color) were as conventional
as artifacts. Therefore, social categories differ from natural kinds in their degree of
objectivity. Finally, the social input has been shown to be determinant in the development
of social essentialism (Cimpian & Markman, 2011). For example, the use generics
facilitates the transmission of social essentialism from parents to children (Rhodes, Leslie
& Tworek, 2012), and significant differences in social essentialism has been shown in
children across different countries (Diesendruck et al. 2013), cultural contexts (Rhodes &
Gelman, 2009a) and racial group membership (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012).
The aforementioned studies suggest that the cultural input has an important role in
shaping the representation of social categories. Although this role is now evident the
precise connection between cultural input and the construction of human kinds is still an
issue of considerable debate. Thus, researchers like Hirschfeld (1996) believe that
humans are endowed with an innate capacity to distinguish kinds of people (a
folksociology), and language would basically mark what those categories are. On the
other side, some researchers (Bigler & Liben, 2010) claim that human kind categories are
only the result of cultural experience. In this context, infant studies are crucial to bring
insight into this debate. According to Hirschfeld (1996), a pure cultural perspective
would be undermined if the emergence of human kinds is traced back to a point as early
as the emergence of natural kinds, which are supposed to be less permeable to the social
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input. Therefore, finding evidence of an early sensitivity to the social organization and
the representation of different kinds of people would support the hypothesis of domainspecific constraints for social essentialism.
Some studies with infants in the first year of life demonstrate an early sensitivity
to gender and racial cues in human faces. Thus, 3-month-old infants show a preference to
look at female faces and own-race faces (Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy & Hodes, 2006; Quinn,
Yahr, Kuhn, Slater & Pascalis, 2002), demonstrating that they are able to distinguish
males from females, and across different races. Quinn et al (2002) also found evidence of
gender-based categorization in 3-4-month-olds, and Anzures, Quinn, Pacalis, Slater and
Lee (2010) found that 9-month-old infants are able to categorize Caucasian faces from
Asian faces. All these studies have revealed an important impact of cultural context in the
infants’ ability to discriminate gender and race between and within categories. In trying
to get more compelling evidence of an abstract representation of race and gender,
Waxman and Grace (2012) tested 7 and 11-month-old infants in categorization tasks
combining faces from different racial and gender groups. For instance, infants were
presented with different faces from the same racial group (e.g. black), but combining
males and females, then two faces from either the same or different racial group were
presented in the test trials. The results show that at 7 months of age infants have an
abstract representation of gender, but only at 11 month they display an abstract
representation of race.
The fact that very early on infants display a preference to look at own-race faces
has opened the question about whether or not this bias reflects a deeper “social
preference” to interact with people who belong to the same racial group. In addressing
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this question, Kinzler and Spelke (2011) presented an event where a black and a white
person offered a toy to the participant simultaneously, and then the children’s choice was
registered. Three age groups were tested, 10-month-old, 2.5-year-old, and 5-year-old
children, in order to track developmental changes. The results show that only 5-year-old
children display a preference to interact with same-race people. Therefore, the looking
preference for own-race faces in infancy may be diagnostic of social familiarity but not of
a social preference.
These results contrast with previous experiments carried out with 10-month-old
infants, where using the same toy choice task infants display a social preference to
interact with people who speak the same participant’s language (Kinzler, Dupoux &
Spelke, 2007). This language base preference is also apparent in the selective imitation of
older infants (Buttermann, Zmyj, Daum & Carpenter, 2013). When 14-month-old infants
are shown a video of two people who speak either a native or a foreign language
performing actions with an object (e.g. touching a screen with the forehead), they tend to
imitate the action only when observe the person who speaks the native language. This
effect, however, has been shown to be mediated by the use of videos in the experimental
setup (Howard, Henderson, Carrazza & Woodward, 2015).
Overall, these results indicate first, that language for infants seems to be a more
relevant social category than race, and second, that early on infants develop a preference
to interact and learn from members of the same social group (Dunham, Baron & Banaji,
2008). Kinzler and Spelke (2011) interpret this finding from a nativist perspective, as
showing that humans may have evolved the capacity to use language but not race like a
valid predictor of group membership or coalitions. This interpretation is supported by
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studies with children and adults, revealing that patterns of cooperation and competition
are better indicators of social membership than race (Cosmides, et al. 2003), and have
rich inductive potential (Rhodes & Brickman, 2011).
Infants have also been shown to be able to distinguish agents based on personality
trait information. Namely, between mean (or hinderers) and nice agents (or helpers). In a
seminal study, Kuhlmeier, Wynn and Bloom (2003) discovered that 12-month-old infants
can predict that an agent will approach to another agent who has been helpful before in
accomplish a goal (e.g. reach the top of a hill), while they show surprise if approaches to
the hinderer agent. In several additional experiments have been shown that infants also
prefer to interact with agents who display a cooperative behavior (Hamlin, Wynn &
Bloom, 2007), and with agents who have punished antisocial others (Hamlin, Mahajan,
Liberman & Wynn, 2013). It has been demonstrated that these social evaluations are
based not on the identification of patterns of behavior but on a mentalistic evaluation
(Hamlin, 2013a; Hamlin, 2013b; Hamlin, Ullman, Tenenbaum, Goodman & Baker,
2013). According to Wynn (2008), these results suggest that a “moral sense” is
operational early in the first year of life. This system allows to differentiate “good”
people from potentially harmful based on the patter of cooperative behavior they display.
Despite being relevant to the discussion about the development of human kinds in
infancy, any of the aforementioned studies have tested directly whether or not those
social representations are organized like kind concepts. More compelling evidence for
this hypothesis come from a study carried out by Powell and Spelke (2013), where 8month-old infants were shown to be able to infer that members of the same social group
may display similar behaviors. Critically, infants were also able to infer that members of
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the same social group share the same preferences, an internal psychological property.
This finding resembles somewhat the results obtained by Diesendruck and Eldror (2011)
with older children about inferences of internal properties across members of the same
ethnic group.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
Even though important progress has been made in revealing how infants
categorize their social world (for example, based on race, language or moral
dispositions), few developmental studies have explicitly undertaken the project of
determining how those social categories are organized in the infants’ mind. In the current
research, we want to address the category of moral dispositions because this is one of the
more studied social categorizations in infancy and there is good evidence that older
children tend to essentialize people based on their moral behavior (Heyman & Gelman,
1999; Heyman & Gelman, 2003). Therefore, in this research we address the following
question: Do infants possess a kind concept for an agents’ moral disposition? As has
been shown before, representing categories like kinds rather than arbitrary classes allows
people to reason about an agents’ identity in terms of unobservable properties. Therefore,
if it is true that moral dispositions are organized like kind concepts, such organization in
the infants’ mind should have consequences in the way they reason about the agents’
identity across different situations, by rendering the agents’ social (moral) membership as
more identity-determining than their behavioral or external properties.
In the current research, we want to explore the possibility of an early
representation of moral dispositions like kind concepts by testing two specific
predictions. First, when information about the agents’ moral disposition is available,
infants should weigh this information more than the overall agents’ appearance to keep
track of their individual identity. In other words, a change in the type of moral disposition
that an agent displays in a social event should be highly diagnostic of a change in the
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number of agents participating in the event, regardless similarities they may display in
their appearance. Second, when information about the agents’ moral disposition is
available and the agents’ insides are visible, infants should use the insides rather than the
external properties to keep track of the agent’s categorical identity. In other words,
internal, “non-obvious” properties should be a more reliable indicator than external
properties of what type of social agent is being observed.
Both predictions will be further elaborated in the introduction section of each
study. However, it is important to clarify that the plausibility of both predictions derive
from three pieces of evidence presented in the previous background research section.
First, from around 6 years of age children believe that social categories (including
personality traits) are defined by internal rather than external properties (Diesendruck &
Eldror, 2011). Second, the pattern of infants’ reasoning in categorization, individuation
and inductive inference tasks across different conceptual domains (artifacts and natural
kinds) demonstrate that early on they expect the world to be populated with ‘kinds’,
meaning that underlying properties define the category membership of some entities (see
Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). Third, infants are able to distinguish agents with positive
social dispositions (“helpers”) from agents with negative social dispositions (“hinderers”;
Hamlyn, Wynn, & Bloom, 2008). This fact suggests that for infants a moral disposition is
a salient property of an agent’s behavior, possibly because of the adaptive significance it
confers for the establishment of social coalitions (see Rhodes & Brickman, 2011). These
three pieces of evidence together suggest that essentialist reasoning is widespread across
domains in infancy and childhood. Therefore, it is at least plausible that this same type of
bias could underlie infants’ representations of others’ moral dispositions.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 1: INDIVIDUATION OF AGENTS BY MORAL DISPOSITIONS

4.1. Experiment 1
4.1.1. Introduction
Infants have been shown to distinguish agents based on the moral dispositions
they display (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn & Bloom, 2003). For
instance, when 6-month-old infants witness different characters engaged in either helping
or hindering actions, they prefer to interact with the character who displayed a
cooperative behavior (Hamlin, 2013a; Hamlin, 2013b). It has been argued that this ability
to differentiate “nice” and “mean” agents derives from an innate moral sense, allowing
people from very early on in life to establish cooperative bonds with perceived in-group
members (Hamlin, 2013; Wynn, 2008).
Even though prior research has indicated that infants are able to represent moral
behaviors as salient properties of social agents, no research to our knowledge has
explored whether they are represented as moral dispositions that are an intrinsic part of an
agent’s individual identity.
Previous research in social psychology has demonstrated that people represent
some social categories and personality traits as highly diagnostic of individual identity
(Haslam, 1998; Heyman & Gelman, 2000). For example, children and adults believe that
social categories like “race” and “ethnicity” are more important than “occupation” or
“skin color” for representing individual identity insofar as these categories are perceived
as immutable and objective (Hirschfeld, 1996). Similarly, some personality traits like
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“intelligence” or “talkativeness” are represented as being pervasive and deeply rooted, in
contrast to other more transient characteristics like “activeness” or “reservedness”
(Haslam, Bastian & Bissett, 2004). Whether or not category membership is perceived as
central in the representation of identity seems to depend on the causal structure of each
category. When a category, either social or biological, is represented as having
unobservable properties that are causally responsible for other visible properties or
distinctive features it is more likely that people use the membership to that category as
highly identity-determining (Ahn, Taylor, Kato, Marsh & Bloom, 2013; Rehder & Kim,
2009). This type of complex and abstract representation has been referred to by a number
of philosophers and psychologist as a kind concept (Gelman, 2004; Putnam, 1975).
When in development the representation of kind concepts emerges has been an
issue of considerable debate (Rakison, 2003; Mandler, 2004). However, some studies
support the hypothesis that kind concepts emerge as early as the end of the first year of
life. For example, in the classic study of Xu and Carey (1996) 10- and 12-month-old
infants were shown an individuation task where one object (e.g. a ball) emerged from
behind a screen, stayed in view for about 5 seconds and then went back to behind the
screen; the same procedure was followed by a second categorically different object (e.g. a
duck) from the opposite side. The results of this study showed that 12-month-old infants
but not 10-month-olds represented two objects behind the screen, as evidenced by their
increased looking when witnessing only one object on the stage once the screen was
raised. According to Xu and Carey (1996), this result suggests that by 12-months of age
infants use category membership (e.g., ‘duck’) as a more reliable cue of object identity
than featural information (e.g., color or shape).
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Although both category membership and featural information are strongly
correlated, further work has demonstrated that infants use the former as the main cue for
individuating objects (Xu, Carey & Quint, 2004). For example, infants who observe the
sequential appearance and disappearance of two objects that vary within a basic-level
kind category (e.g. a sippy cup and a coffee mug) respond as if they only represent a
single object behind the screen, even though the two objects could be easily distinguished
by the different surface properties they possess. In contrast, infants who observe objects
that vary across basic-level kinds (e.g. a cup and a ball) represent that there are two
objects involved in the event. Other work has replicated this result adding more stringent
controls of similarity in the objects’ appearance (Kingo & Krojggard, 2011), and
extended the findings to 9-month-olds using a reaching paradigm rather than typical
looking time measures (Xu & Baker, 2005).
More recent studies in object individuation have demonstrated that kind
categories are widely used as a central component in the infants’ representation of object
identity. For example, one study determined that 10-month-old infants individuate two
objects behind a screen if the artifacts are associated with two different functions (Futo,
Teglas, Csibra & Gergely, 2010). Similarly, 10-month-old infants individuate two objects
if one of them displays self-propelled motion and agentive features (e.g. a worm) and the
other looks like a typical inanimate object (e.g. a box; Surian & Caldi, 2010). Together
these studies suggest that early on infants tend to disregard visible properties in favor of
category membership and non-visible properties (e.g. an artifact’s function and agency)
when keeping track of object identity over time.
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The current research aims to extend the previous findings about the development
of kind representations to the domain of social categories by testing whether or not
infants are able to individuate agents based on the moral dispositions they display. This
investigation will provide insight into whether infants’ representations of moral
categories are relatively abstract. An early emergence of a kind representation would
indicate that for infants, “mean” and “nice” are not just categories with distinctive
patterns of behavior and intentions, but the result of intrinsic and unobservable properties
common to other agents who exhibit the same type of moral disposition.
Our methodological approach combines the classic object individuation task (e.g.,
Xu & Carey, 1996) and a recent task designed by Hamlin and Wynn (2011) where a
character struggles to open a transparent box. In all of the experiments reported here the
subjects observe characters emerging two times from behind a screen to demonstrate
same or different sequences of social behavior towards another agent. The main
hypothesis is that 11-month-old infants will individuate two agents only when they
witness social behaviors with different moral dispositions, regardless of the physical
appearance these agents exhibit or other low-level cues. We work with this age range
because previous studies have shown that the infants’ ability to use kind concepts to
individuate objects emerges around 10-12 months of age.

4.1.2. Method
4.1.2.1. Participants
Sixteen 11-month-old infants participated in this experiment (M = 11 months, 3
days, SD = 8 days). Half of them were girls. All infants were recruited from the Amherst,
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Massachusetts area. Eleven additional infants participated but were excluded from
analysis because of fussiness (2) and experimental error (9). 1

4.1.2.2. Materials
Infants sat on their parent’s lap facing a black stage measuring 118 cm. wide x 75
cm. high (see Appendix A for examples of the stimuli and the experimental setup). The
room was dimly lit and parents were instructed to remain silent along the experiment.
Infants observed a transparent box (35 cm. wide x 19 cm. deep and 12 cm. high) resting
on the center of the stage with two different-colored cubes (5 cm x 5 cm) inside. At the
right corner of the stage infants observed a blue screen (25 cm high x 36 cm wide) in a
vertical position. There was a gap of 12 cm between the screen and the right frame of the
stage and a gap of 17 cm between the screen and the box. Three different puppets were
used in the experiment, all measuring 18 x 10 cm. A cow puppet served as the
“Protagonist” who struggled to open the box. A pig puppet served as the “Opener” who
emerged from behind the screen and helped the Protagonist to open the box by lifting the
lid. Another identical pig puppet served as the “Closer” who hindered the Protagonist
from opening the box by slamming the lid shut. A black curtain was lowered between
trials to hide the stage. Two video cameras recorded events for posterior analyses, one
focused on the infant’s face and the other focused on the stage.

1

The complexity of the procedure led to a high number of experimental errors early in
our testing. The following is a breakdown of the specific errors: The pig behind the
screen was visible for the participant (1), the cow was left on the stage in the test trials
(1), the experimenter applied a wrong order of trials (2), the timing of the events was
wrong (1), the screen fell in the show revealing the pigs behind (3), or the screen was
placed on the wrong position (1).
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4.1.2.3. Design and Procedure
Infants were shown 4 baseline trials, 2 familiarization trials, and 4 test trials in a
typical violation-of-expectation design as described below.
Baseline Trials. In the Baseline Trials, the curtain was raised revealing an upright
blue screen on the stage, then one of the experimenters drew the infant’s attention to the
stage using infant-directed speech (“Hi [baby’s name], look here”) before dropping the
screen revealing either one or two identical pig puppets. Infants’ looking time was
recorded and the trial finished when they either looked away for at least two consecutive
seconds or after 60 seconds of cumulative looking. This procedure was repeated for a
total of 4 baseline trials. The number of revealed objects was counterbalanced across
participants (baseline trial block: 1, 2, 2, 1 or 2, 1, 1, 2).
Familiarization Trials. The familiarization trials were modeled from the original
box task used in previous demonstrations of infants’ moral evaluation (e.g., Hamlin &
Wynn, 2011). In the show the Protagonist puppet entered the stage from the left corner
and moved to one side of the box. She leaned down to look inside the box three times,
then jumped on the front left corner of the box. She then attempted to open the box four
times. On the first two attempts she pulled up, lifted the edge of the box a few inches, and
dropped it back down. On the third and fourth attempts, she lifted the edge of the lid and
lowered it while continuously holding onto the lid, as if the lid was too heavy for her to
open. On the fifth attempt, a Pig puppet moved out from behind the left side of the
screen, and moved forward next to the box.
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During the Opening trial, the Pig puppet jumped on the front right corner of the
box, and both the Pig and Protagonist opened the box together. The Protagonist dove
down into the box, grabbed one cube, and jumped out of the box to the left side of the
stage. The Pig closed the lid and jumped off the box, moving back to behind the screen.
During the Closing trial, the Pig puppet jumped on the frontal right corner of the
box, slamming the lid. The Protagonist jumped off the box to the left side of the stage.
The Pig puppet jumped off the box, moving back to behind the screen. Both Opening and
Closing trials lasted approximately 15 seconds. Once the puppet in the second trial
moved behind the screen the Protagonist took the cube she obtained in the Opening trial
and ran out of the stage. After 5 seconds the curtain was lowered. Opening and Closing
trials were counterbalance across participants.
Test Trials. The first phase of the test trials was identical to the familiarization
trials, with infants observing both Opening and Closing trials. In the second phase, once
all actions stopped one of the experimenters drew the infant’s attention to the screen
using infant-directed speech (“Hi [baby’s name], look here”) and she dropped the screen
revealing either one or two identical pig puppets. The Trial Outcome (blocked: 1, 2, 2, 1
or 2, 1, 1, 2) and Trial Order (Opening first or Closing first) were counterbalanced across
participants. In all four test trials infants observed the transparent box with one cube
inside beside the screen. The duration of the infants’ looking time was coded by two
independent observers who were blind to the conditions. The inter-observer agreement
was high (r = .96).
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4.1.3. Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses found no effects of sex, Trial Outcome (1 object or 2 objects
first) or Trial Order (Opening first or Closing first); therefore, these variables were
collapsed in subsequent analyses. A 2 (outcome: one or two objects) X 2 (trial type:
baseline or test) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded no significant
main effect for Outcome, F(1, 15) = .01, p = .92, eta = .001, and Trial Type, F(1, 15) =
.31, p = .59, eta = .02. Importantly, this analysis revealed a significant interaction
between Outcome and Trial Type, F(1, 15) = 13.4, p = .002, eta = .47, which resulted
from longer looking times toward Two Object outcomes (M = 9.81 s., SD = 3.89 s.) than
One Object outcomes (M = 7.56 s., SD = 2.93 s.) in the Baseline Trials, and longer
looking times toward One Object outcomes (M = 10.5 s., SD = 4.54 s.) than Two Objects
outcomes (M = 8.09 s., SD = 2.92 s.) in the Test Trials. Planned comparison t-tests of
one- versus two-object outcomes revealed a significant difference in the baseline (t(15) =
-3.2, p = .006, two-tailed) and a marginally significant difference in the test trials (t(15) =
185, p = .08, two-tailed). A total of 12 out of 16 infants had a larger preference for two
objects on the Test Trials than on the Baseline Trials (p = .04, via a binomial test).
The results of this experiment suggest that 11-month-old infants succeeded in
individuating two agents behind the screen, although both puppets involved in the
helping-hindering actions displayed the same external properties. These results are
important for two reasons. First, they support the hypothesis that at the end of the first
year of life infants represent moral dispositions as highly identity-determining. For
infants at this age, observing two different moral actions at different times is more likely
to be interpreted as two individuals than only one agent who has changed their moral
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disposition towards another. Second, these results add evidence for the relatively early
emergence of kind concepts in the first year of life. Previous studies have reported that as
early as 10 months of age infants tend to use abstract and non-observable information like
more diagnostic of agents’ identity than other more accessible properties. Along the same
vein, the current study demonstrates that infants are able to use abstract properties like
moral dispositions to keep track of the agents’ identity. Thus, the representation of kind
concepts could be an early achievement in several domains, including social categories.
Even though in the current experiment infants succeeded in individuating agents,
this effect may be the result of infants’ ability to individuate based on the number of
actions they observe rather than being based on different moral dispositions. Previous
studies have reported that 6-month-olds are able to individuate and enumerate actions
from continuous motion (Sharon & Wynn, 1998; Wynn, 1996). For example, when
infants observe a sequence of 2 identical actions (jumps) they dishabituate when
observing 3 actions, even if both sequences have the same duration. Therefore, an
alternative explanation for the pattern of results reported here is that infants count 2
actions along each trial (one for the Opener and another for the Closer) and then they
expect a correspondence between the number of actions and the number of puppets
behind the screen, resulting in longer looking times for 1 object than for 2 objects
outcome in the test trials. To test for this possibility a second experiment was run using
the same box task but presenting 2 identical moral dispositions in each trial, either
helping or hindering actions. If in the first experiment infants individuate actions based
only on numerical information, the pattern of results should be replicated in the second
experiment.
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Figure 1. Mean Looking-Time Results Experiment 1.

4.2. Experiment 2
4.2.1. Method
4.2.1.1. Participants
Sixteen 11-month-old infants participated in this experiment (M = 11 months, 2
days, SD = 7 days). Half of them were girls. All infants were recruited from the Amherst,
Massachusetts area. Three additional infants participated but were excluded from analysis
because of fussiness (2) and experimental error (1).

4.2.1.2. Materials, Design, and Procedure
The materials, design and procedure for the second experiment were the same for
that of Experiment 1, except that both social actions infants witnessed were identical in
the pattern of motion and in the moral disposition they display (both helping actions or
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both hindering actions). The type of moral disposition infants observed was
counterbalance across participants. In order to be consistent regarding the number of
cubes that infants observe in the box across test trials and across experiments, the
hindering event started off with only one cube inside the box, and the helping event
started off with three cubes inside the box. The result of two helping actions and two
hindering actions was always one cube inside the box. The inter-observer agreement of
this experiment was high (r = .95).

4.2.2. Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses found no effects of sex, Trial Outcome (1 object or 2 objects
first) or Trial Order (Opening first or Closing first); therefore, these variables were
collapsed in subsequent analyses. A 2 (outcome: 1 or 2 objects) X 2 (trial type: baseline
or test) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded no significant main
effect for Outcome, F(1, 15) = 2.08, p = .17, eta = .012, and Trial Type, F(1, 15) = .71, p
= .41, eta = .04. This analysis did not reveal a significant interaction between Outcome
and Trial Type, F(1, 15) = .105, p = .75, eta = .007. Infants spent the same time looking
at the 1 and 2 objects outcome in both the baseline trials (M = 8.48, SD = 5.09; M = 9.1,
SD = 3.72, for one object and two objects respectively, t(15) = -.69, p = .5, two-tailed)
and the test trials (M = 7.3, SD = 3.27; M = 8.4, SD = 3.44, for 1 object and 2 objects
respectively, t(15) = -1.1, p = .28, two-tailed). Finally, a 2 (outcome: 1 or 2 objects) X 2
(trial type: baseline or test) X 2 (Experiment Type: Experiment 1 or Experiment 2)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant three-way interaction among
Outcome, Trial Type and Experiment Type, F(1, 30) = 7.02, p = .01, eta = .19. This
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interaction reveals that the pattern of results in Experiment 2 is significantly different
from that of Experiment 1.
The results of Experiment 2 show that infants fail to individuate 2 objects behind
the screen. Although infants always observe 2 emergences and two separate actions
within each trial they do not seem to use this information to infer the number of objects
present behind the screen. Previous studies have shown that infants are able to
individuate and count actions (Wynn, 1996), however the results of the current
experiment show that the number of actions they observe in each trial is not salient
enough to represent different agents in a spatiotemporal ambiguous situation.
Additionally, in this experiment infants observed conflicting evidence to individuate
objects. On the one hand, numerical information indicated two objects behind the screen,
and on the other hand featural and social information suggested only one object. This
conflict may have increased the uncertainty about the number of puppets behind the
screen.
Even though the Experiment 2 rules out the option of object individuation based
on the number of actions perceived, there are other two low-level explanations that may
account for the results in Experiment 1. First, helping and hindering actions differ not
only in the moral disposition they represent, but also in the pattern of motion that those
actions display. Hindering actions are characterized by pushing the lid down and helping
actions by lifting the lid. Second, helping and hindering actions differ also in the type of
first order goal that mediates the social interaction. Namely, a hindering action in the box
task requires the intention to close the box, resulting in the representation of that agent as
a “closer”, while a helping action requires the intention to open the box, resulting in the
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representation of that agent as an “opener”. Either of these alternatives, or both together,
may be driving the effect observed in Experiment 1 without any commitment with the
social interaction among the different characters. In order to test for these possibilities a
third experiment was conducted presenting a puppet show with one character opening
and closing a box at different times. The Protagonist was eliminated from the show to
avoid any interpretation of the events in terms of social interactions. If infants individuate
agents based on differences in motion cues and first-order goals, the pattern of results of
the first experiment should be replicated in the current one.
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Figure 2. Mean Looking-Time Results Experiment 2.

4.3. Experiment 3
4.3.1. Method
4.3.1.1. Participants
Data collection is still ongoing. So far participants are 14 infants out of 16 (M =
11 months, 1 day, SD = 7 days), seven males and seven females. All infants were
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recruited from the Amherst, Massachusetts area. One additional infant participated but he
was excluded from analysis because of fussiness.

4.3.1.1. Materials, Design, and Procedure
The materials and design of the third experiment will be the same for that of
Experiment 1, except that in the Familiarization and Test Trials the Protagonist (the cow)
and the cubes inside the box will be removed from the show. The pattern of motion of
both the Opening and the Closing actions will be very similar to the pattern of motion
used in the previous two experiments. During Opening trials, the Pig puppet will jump on
the frontal right corner of the box, pulling up the lid completely backwards. During
Closing events, the Pig puppet will grab the lid to close the box in a forward movement.
A pause of about 5 seconds between both actions will be used.

4.3.2. Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses found no effects of sex, Trial Outcome (1 object or 2 objects
first) or Trial Order (Opening first or Closing first); therefore, these variables were
collapsed in subsequent analyses. A 2 (outcome: 1 or 2 objects) X 2 (trial type: baseline
or test) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded no significant main
effect for Outcome, F(1, 13) = .12, p = .73, eta < .01, and Trial Type, F(1, 13) = 3.13, p =
.1, eta = .22, As in the previous experiment, this analysis did not reveal a significant
interaction between Outcome and Trial Type, F(1, 13) = .038, p = .85, eta < .01. Infants
spent the same time looking at the 1 and 2 objects outcome in both the baseline trials (M
= 9.74, SD = 5.75; M = 9.89, SD = 5.1, for one object and two objects respectively, t(14)
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= -.007, p = .99, two-tailed) and the test trials (M = 11.93, SD = 4.93; M = 12.57, SD =
4.32, for 1 object and 2 objects respectively, t(14) = -.5, p = .62, two-tailed). Finally, a 2
(outcome: 1 or 2 objects) X 2 (trial type: baseline or test) X 2 (Experiment Type:
Experiment 1 or Experiment 3) analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant
three-way interaction among Outcome, Trial Type and Experiment Type, F(1, 28) = 4.1,
p = .044, eta = .1. This interaction reveals that the pattern of results in Experiment 2 is
significantly different from that of Experiment 1.
The partial results of Experiment 3 show that infants fail to individuate 2 objects
behind the screen. Although the pattern of motion for Closing and Opening trials are
perceptually similar to the pattern of motion of Helping and Hindering events of
Experiment 1 infants do not seem to use this information to infer the number of objects
involved in the show in the current experiment. These results are in line with previous
findings in individuation studies. For example, in the second experiment of Surian and
Caldi (2010) 10-month-old infants observed two different animals emerging from
different sides of the screen in a typical individuation paradigm. Crucially for the current
experiment, both animals displayed different locomotion (e.g. walking, crawling,
jumping, and flying). In spite of clear differences in appearance and pattern of motion
infants failed to individuate two agents.
The current experiment also rules out the possibility of object individuation based
on different first-order intentions; namely, the intention to close and the intention to open
a box. Therefore, at least in this particular scenario, 11-month-old infants know that two
different non-social intentions are not sufficient evidence to represent two different
individuals.
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Figure 3. Mean Looking-Time Results Experiment 3

4.4. General Discussion
The current study used an individuation task to investigate whether 11-month-old
infants use moral dispositions to keep track of the agents’ individual identity. Experiment
1 found that when infants observe two different socio-moral actions, helping-hindering,
they individuate two agents, regardless similarities in external properties those agents
display. By contrast, in Experiment 2 we found that when infants observe two identical
socio-moral actions, either helping-helping or hindering-hindering, they fail to
individuate two agents, indicating that infants do not use the perceived number of actions
to infer the number of agents involved in the show. Likewise, so far in Experiment 3
infants fail to individuate two agents based on differences in motion and first-order
intentions, close and open a box, that resemble the actions infants observed in
Experiment 1.
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The results of all three experiments together suggest that around the end of the
first year of life infants represent moral dispositions as more identity-determining than
agents’ overall appearance, first-order goals and differences in motion. This may indicate
an early bias to represent moral dispositions in terms of different categories, so that
antisocial and prosocial behaviors are more readily attributed to different agents than to
the same agent. This bias could be associated to the categorical representation of in-group
versus out-group members based on the perception of coalitional alliances. Identifying
and keeping track of a person as an antisocial individual that is different from cooperative
members in a community could be relevant for increasing the likelihood of survival.
The categorical representation of prosocial and antisocial agents seems to lead
infants in the current set of experiments to treat moral dispositions as an attribute resistant
to change. This is a typical feature of essentialized categories like natural kinds and other
social kinds. For instance, people believe that a dog cannot change its identity even if his
appearance and behavior are cat-like. This suggests that moral dispositions are
represented as kind categories, and therefore possessing a non-observable property
responsible for the agents’ individual identity over time. Thus, the current study is in
agreement with previous kind-based individuation studies of natural and artifact
categories, adding evidence for an early emergence of kind concepts.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 2: INSIDES AND MORAL DISPOSITIONS
5.1. Experiment 1
5.1.1. Introduction
A growing body of literature suggest that by 5 years of age children outweigh
internal properties over external properties when reasoning about social categories. For
example, children this age believe that people who belong to the same social group may
share both internal biological properties and internal psychological characteristics
(Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011), and they believe that internal properties are more
important for inferring peoples’ social membership than labels and other external
properties (Diesendruck & Weiss, 2015). This evidence has led some researches to
suggest that children represent peoples’ internal properties as a proxy for an essential
attribute that is responsible for their category membership and social identity
(Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011).
What are the developmental origins of this abstract representation? Recent
investigations suggest that language, and in particular the use of generics in pedagogical
contexts, is an important factor in the transmission of social essentialism in preschoolaged children (Diesendruck & Deblinger-Tangi, 2014; Rhodes, Leslie & Tworek, 2012).
However, it is unknown how children reason about the role of internal properties in social
categories before language acquisition. Some researchers have suggested that domainspecific cognitive biases may operate early in infancy to shape the children’s
representation of social categories. For example, according to Gil-White (2001) social
essentialism is the by-product of reasoning about people in terms of biological kinds. In
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particular, he proposes that due to surface similarities people represent ethnic groups like
different “species.” Because animals have been shown to be highly essentialized across
different cultures (Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989), ethnic groups turn out to be conceptualized
in a similar fashion. Likewise, Hirschfeld (1996) proposes that humans are endowed with
an innate capacity to distinguish kind of people (a “folksociology”) and language would
basically mark what those categories are. From either perspective – an innate social
module or analogical transfer—the emergence of social essentialism could be traced back
in development well before 4-5 years of age when most of the studies have reported the
presence of essentialist beliefs in children.
Some recent studies with infants have shown an early appreciation of the
importance of internal properties when reasoning about biological entities. For example,
Welder and Graham (2006) discovered that 14-month-olds are more willing to categorize
objects based on internal properties when they look like animate objects (e.g. with eyes)
but not when they look like inanimate containers. Newman, Herrmann, Wynn, and Keil
(2008) also demonstrated that when 14-month-old infants are presented with selfpropelled semitransparent objects displaying different types of motion they tend to
associate the color of internal properties with a particular type of motion. Crucially, in a
second experiment these authors demonstrated that when objects lack of self-propelled
motion infants do not show a significantly higher preference for internal over external
properties. The importance of self-propelled motion in the infants’ representation of
internal properties has been further investigated in work showing that 8-month-olds infer
that self-propelled and agentive entities should have something inside (Setoh, Wu,
Baillargeon & Gelman, 2013). Importantly, when objects lack either self-propelled
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motion or agentive features infants do not show any expectation about objects’ internal
properties. The authors interpret these findings as showing that infants believe that
internal properties are causally responsible for both animals’ agentive features and selfpropelled motion. Finally, using semitransparent objects Taborda-Osorio and Cheries
(2015) show that 13-month-old infants are able to individuate agents based on the color
of their internal features, while they disregard color properties in the agents’ external
appearance, suggesting that infants this age represent the agents’ internal properties as
more diagnostic of individual identity than external properties.
Although these previous studies show an early bias toward internal properties,
none of them test whether internal properties play a role in the infants’ conceptualization
of social categories. The main hypothesis of the current study is that if infants essentialize
social categories like older children do, they may be biased to outweigh internal
properties over external properties to keep track of the agents’ social membership. This
pattern of reasoning would be in agreement with how infants have been shown to
categorize objects in other domains. For instance, Ware and Booth (2010) demonstrated
that 17-month-olds categorize artifacts based on the perceptual properties they display
only when these properties are diagnostic of deeper functional properties. Therefore,
infants in the second year of life seem to have the notion that non-obvious properties are
more reliable cues of kind membership than obvious external features, like shape or
color. The current study aims to bring some insight into how this same pattern of
reasoning may operate in the domain of social kinds at the onset of language acquisition.
Typically, developmental studies in social kinds with preschool-aged children are
focused on categories such as race and ethnicity (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a). However,
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these have been shown to vary significantly across different cultures and depend in to a
great extent on the social input that the child receives (Diesendruck & Goldfein-Elbaz,
2013; Kinzler & Dautel 2012; Diesendruck & Deblinger-Tangi, 2014). By contrast,
infants as early as 6 months of age have been shown to distinguish agents based on their
socio-moral dispositions. In concrete terms, infants show a preference for agents who
display cooperative behavior over agents who display antisocial behavior (Hamlin &
Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2008; Wynn, 2007), and they expect other agents
to show the same preference (Kuhlmeier, Wynn & Bloom, 2003). Therefore, if infants
have an essentialist representation of these moral categories they may be willing to use
visible internal properties as a more reliable cue of kind membership than external
features. To test this hypothesis, a replica of the classic “hill task” will be used with 14month-olds. We use this age range because previous studies have shown that infants
display a bias toward internal properties at around 13-14 months of age. In our “hill task”
infants observe one character trying to reach the top of a hill unsuccessfully, then two
other agents with different geometric shapes and color are shown either helping or
hindering the main character to fulfill its goal. In the current study, the geometric figures
will be replaced with semitransparent objects with internal and external properties of the
same color. During test trials, two different characters will be presented in front of the
infant. One will display the internal properties of the helper character and the external
properties of the hinderer, while the other will display the opposite combination. If
infants use internal properties to keep track of the agents’ membership, they may prefer
to interact with the character with the same internal features of the original helper agent,
even though it displays different external features.
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5.1.2. Method
5.1.2.1. Participants
Sixteen 14-month-old infants participated in this experiment (M = 14 months, 14
days, SD = 8 days). Half of them were girls. All infants were recruited from the Amherst,
Massachusetts area. Six additional infants participated but were excluded from analysis
because of fussiness (2) and failure to choose (4).

5.1.2.2. Apparatus
Infants sat on their parent’s lap facing a display stage of 120 cm. wide x 95 cm.
high. (see Appendix B for examples of the stimuli and the experimental setup). The room
was dimly lit and parents were instructed to remain silent along the experiment. The
display stage had a white background made of foam and a green base made of wood, with
a 4 inches canal rising from lower left to upper right corner, resembling a hill. It had a
small plateau one-third of the way up and a second at the top. The climber character was
a blue circle made of wood with googly eyes placed on the upper half looking toward the
top of the hill. The other four characters were plastic transparent cans 20 cm. high and 10
cm. wide. Each character had two googly eyes attached on the upper half of the can. Two
identical pyramidal structures made of balls of cotton were placed one in the bottom of
the can (the internal property) and the other on the very top, attached to the lid (the
external property). A white paper sheet was folded inside the can, covering the back and
the upper half of the can. Two of these characters (the helper and the hinderer) had the
same color properties inside and outside: one with red cotton and the other with yellow
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cotton. The other two characters (the test characters) had a contrasting combination of
color properties: one with yellow cotton inside and red cotton outside, and the other with
red cotton inside and yellow cotton outside. A white foam sheet of 50 cm long and 20 cm
wide was used to place the two test characters in the test trial. A black curtain was
lowered between trials to hide the stage. Two video cameras recorded events for posterior
analyses, one focused on the infant’s face and the other focused on the stage.

5.1.2.3. Procedure
The procedure of the current experiment was modeled from the original Hamlin,
Wynn and Bloom (2008) study. The curtain was first raised and lowered three times
without any character in the display stage. In each familiarization trial the climber
character wiggled for one second while on the left bottom of the stage, then climbed to
the middle plateau where paused and wiggled again for one second. The climber
subsequently attempted twice to reach the top of the hill, each time falling back to the
middle plateau. On a third attempt, the climber was either pushed up to the top by the
helper, or pushed down to the bottom by the hinderer. In the helping event, the helper
entered to the display stage from the lower left, moved up the incline and pushed the
climber twice, each time pushing it closer to the top until the climber reached the upper
plateau. Once on the top the climber wiggled while the helper went downhill to the
bottom plateau and paused. In the hinderer event, the hinderer entered to the display stage
from the upper right, moved down the incline and pushed the climber twice, each time
pushing it closer to the middle plateau. The climber then moved downhill to the lower
plateau, and the hinderer moved back to the top of the hill and paused. Total duration of
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each event was 10 sec. Infants were exposed to three hindering events and three helping
events.
In the test trial, the experimenter presented both test characters 40 cm. apart on a
board, and asked “Can you show me who is the nice one?” Then she moved the board
forward and looked down. Infant’s choice was defined as the character touched first, as
judged by the (blind) coder, with the constraint that the infant had to be looking at the toy
during or immediately preceding the touch. The color of the hinderer and helper
characters, the order of habituation trials, and the left-right position of the test characters
were counterbalanced across participants.

5.1.3. Results and Discussion
Preliminary analysis did not reveal order effects of the position of the test
characters, habituation trials or the order of color presentation. Results show that infants
robustly chose the character with the same color inside as the helper character in the
familiarization trials (13 out of 16, p = .02, two-tailed, by a binomial probability test).
This result, first, replicates previous findings where infants this age and younger choose
the helper character after being exposed to socio-moral events with a helper and a
hinderer character. Second, the current study extends previous findings by showing that
infants are able to use the color of internal properties to keep track of agents’ socio-moral
membership. In other words, infants identify the “nice” character based on the internal
properties while they disregard the external properties the character displays. Thereby,
this study provides support for the hypothesis that moral categories are represented like
intrinsic and essentialized categories at the onset of language acquisition.
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Why do infants use internal physical properties as a more reliable cue of moral
disposition than equally visible external properties? One possibility is that infants may be
biased to represent moral categories, and other categories in diverse conceptual domains,
as kind categories. That is, infants reason about social agents under the assumption that
non-obvious properties are causally responsible for the pattern of behavior and moral
dispositions they display. In this regard, the possession of some external characteristic
features (such as skin color for race, or patterns of behavior for moral categories) is not
the reason by which an entity belongs to a category, but rather the effect of some deeper,
typically unobservable, causal essence. Just as agents’ internal properties have been
shown to be represented from very early on as an important biological property (Setoh, et
al., 2012) and more relevant for agents’ identity than external properties (Taborda-Osorio
& Cheries, 2015), infants in the current study may use those internal properties as a proxy
for an essential moral disposition. It remains to be seen how early this reasoning toward
sociomoral dispositions emerges, and what is the developmental trajectory along
childhood. Although infants as early as 6 months of age seem to distinguish “mean” from
“nice” agents it is unclear if they would be equally willing to associate those dispositions
with internal properties. For this infants would have to assume first that animate agents
have insides, and second that sociomoral dispositions are causally motivated by intrinsic
properties. The earliest evidence of attribution of internal properties to animals is at 8
months of age, so it is feasible that even before the first year of life infants exhibit a
similar bias toward internal properties as 14-month-olds do.
A central piece in the previous interpretation is that infants pay more attention
toward agents’ internal properties because they have a more relevant causal role in the
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representation of moral categories. As it has been demonstrated in several experiments
about categorization, adults and children tend to categorize objects based on features that
have a causal role in supporting the presence of other features (Ahn, 1998; Ahn, Gelman,
Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 2000; Rehder, 2003). Therefore, a more direct way to
test the hypothesis that 14-month-olds represent internal properties as a proxy for an
essence would be to determine whether or not infants attribute causal potency to the
internal properties they perceive in the characters involved in socio-moral behavior. To
test this hypothesis a second experiment will be run where infants, prior to the
habituation, witness one of two types of familiarization trials: either an event of the
insides being removed or an event of the outsides being removed. In both events, once
the property has been removed infants will observe the character moving up and down
along the hill on the display stage. The goal with this manipulation is to demonstrate to
the infant that either the internal or the external property is not causally relevant for the
pattern of motion the agents display. In the case of removing the insides we expect that
by weakening the role of this internal property in infants’ representation of biological
agency and individual identity, they will be less biased to use internal properties like the
main cue of kind membership. By contrast, in the case of removing the outsides infants
should still be willing to use the internal properties like the main cue of kind membership.
Experiment 2 also addresses an alternative explanation for the pattern of results in
Experiment 1. Infants may prioritize the internal features because they are placed on the
bottom part of the toy where animals have mobile parts (e.g. the month and legs). If this
is true, we should replicate the results in both conditions (insides removed and outsides
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removed) because in both cases the internal part was visible on the bottom along the
helping and the hindering trials.

5.2. Experiment 2
5.2.1. Method
5.2.1.1. Participants
Data collection is still ongoing. So far participants are 12 infants (M = 14 months,
11 days, SD = 6 days), six males and seven females. Infants were randomly assigned to
either Insides Removed condition (6) or Outsides Removed condition (6). All infants
were recruited from the Amherst, Massachusetts area. One additional infant participated
but he was excluded from analysis because of fussiness.

5.2.1.2. Apparatus
The display stage, the climber character, and the test characters were the same as
in Experiment 1. The helper and the hinderer character had the same overall appearance
but the bottom of the can has a hole through which the internal material can be removed,
and the external material is attached to the top with small flat magnets to facilitate its
removal.

5.2.1.3. Procedure
Prior to the habituation trials, separate groups of infants witnessed two
familiarization trials (one for the helper character and the other for the hinderer
character), presenting either an event of temporarily removing the insides (the Insides
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Removed Condition) or an event of temporarily removing the outsides (the Outsides
Removed Condition). In both events the trial started with the character placed on the
middle plateau, a hand wearing a white glove showed up through the canal while the
experimenter called the infant’s attention with infant-directed speech (“look here [baby’s
name]”). Next the experimenter proceeded to remove either the internal or the external
material, pausing for about one second while moving the now detached property 10 cm
apart from the character, after which either the external or internal material was
withdrawn from the display stage through an opening by the edge of the stage. With the
property now absent, the character was shown climbing the hill all the way up, then
moving all the way down to the bottom, and then climbing back to the middle plateau
where it pauses. This sequence of events was then repeated for the other-colored puppet.
Then, either the internal or the external properties were put back in the character out of
the infant’s view. All other six habituation trials and the test trial occurred in the same
fashion as in Experiment 1.

5.2.2. Results and Discussion
Expected results. We predict that infants will not show a reaching preference
towards either test trial object in the Insides Removed Condition. In contrast, we expect
to replicate the significant reaching preference we observed in Experiment 1 in the
Outsides Removed Condition, in such a way that infants choose the helper character
based on the color of its internal properties. These results would indicate that only when
internal properties are represented like functional biological properties with causal
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potency infants are willing to use those properties to keep track of the agent’s sociomoral membership.
Current results. In the Insides Removed Condition 3 out of 6 infants chose the
character with the same color inside as the helper character in the familiarization trials,
while in the Outsides Removed Condition 4 out of 6 infants chose the character with the
same color insides as the helper. Although overall this pattern of results is in agreement
with what it was predicted, 6 participants in each condition is still a too small sample size
to conclude anything. These results could also indicate that infants chose randomly in
both conditions, suggesting that the experimental manipulation disrupted the
identification of the helper character in both conditions. More subjects will be ran to tease
apart both possibilities. However, so far we do not have evidence to support the
hypothesis that infants attribute causal potency to the agents’ internal properties.
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CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The partial results of Study 1 suggest that 11-month-old infants are able to
individuate agents based on sociomoral information. In Experiment 1 infants expected
two individuals behind the screen when they observed two different sociomoral behaviors
at different times. Experiment 2 ruled out the alternative low-level explanation of
individuation based only on numerical information. So far, Experiment 3 rules out the
possibility of individuation based on differences in motion or differences in first-order
goals. If the pattern of results in Experiment 3 follow our prediction and infants fail to
individuate objects, this would support the hypothesis that the representation of agents as
either prosocial or antisocial is more identity-determining than similarities in featural
information.
The partial results of Study 2 suggest that 14-month-old infants are able to use
agents’ internal properties as a more reliable cue to distinguish prosocial from antisocial
agents. Experiment 1 showed that infants identify the prosocial character based on the
color of its internal features. Experiment 2 will determine if this bias is the result of a
causal understanding of internal properties associated with the generation of agentive
behavior. If the pattern of results in Experiment 2 follow our prediction and the
identification of the prosocial agent is disrupted in the “insides removal condition” and
preserved in the “outsides removal condition”, this would support the hypothesis that
internal properties are more essential than external properties by virtue of their causal
role in the generation of prosocial and antisocial behavior.
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As a reminder, the main hypothesis of the current set of studies is that at the end
of the first year of life infants possess kind concepts for representing sociomoral
dispositions. That is to say that infants, first, represent “mean” and “good” traits as
general and abstract categories composed by indefinitely many instances (Prasada, 2012).
Thus, examples of prosocial and antisocial behavior could be interpreted as qualitatively
different from each other in a fundamental way. Second, whether an agent displays either
a prosocial or an antisocial behavior depends mainly on the possession of an internal nonvisible property that is causally responsible for those behaviors. In other words, being
“mean” or being “good” does not depend on contingent external properties of a particular
person, but on internal attributes that “good” and “mean” people share. Previous studies
have shown that children use such an abstract and complex representation to reason about
personality traits and, in particular, about sociomoral traits. For example, children find
“nice” and “mean” traits more inductively powerful than the external appearance of
people (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). They infer that people with the same personality trait
share similar emotions, behaviors and thoughts regardless their external appearance. This
suggests that for children the labels “nice” and “mean” indicate deep similarities.
Additionally, children believe that positive personality traits tend to remain more stable
across time and different situations than neutral attributes (Diesendruck & Lindenbaum,
2009). Therefore, if the origins of such an abstract kind-based representation can be
traced back to the first two years of life, infants should represent “mean” and “good”
dispositions as relatively stable over time, qualitatively different each other, and they may
base this reasoning on the attribution of internal properties.
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Overall, the current set of studies support our main hypothesis because moral
dispositions are represented as a central component of individual identity (Study 1), and
because the distinction between prosocial and antisocial agents is mainly based on
internal properties (Study 2). However, these findings allow two different interpretations.
First, similar to natural kind concepts (e.g. animals) infants may believe that the moral
categories “good” or “mean” are objective, mutually exclusive, and intrinsic kinds. In
other words, they believe that there are two types of completely different people in the
world, “good” or “mean”. This representation would be objective because the category
membership of each agent should be discovered through observation. They are mutually
exclusive because no agent can be good and mean at the same time. And they are
intrinsic because people cannot change their moral category membership over time.
Study 1 seems to support this interpretation insofar as infants tend to infer two different
characters rather than one when observing different sociomoral actions, so they seem to
be represented as mutually exclusive categories. Study 2 also supports this interpretation
because internal properties are usually linked to objective kinds for both animals and
plants, so that internal properties are stable and do not change over time. This type of
“natural kind” representation of moral categories could be the result of early biases to
identify uncooperative people as members of external groups, while cooperative people
could be identified as members of the same observer’s group. Therefore, representing
“good” and “mean” as objective and intrinsic kinds associated with in-group and outgroup members could be useful for predicting future behaviors (e.g. a mean character will
always display an uncooperative behavior in any type of situation).
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A second interpretation of the current set of studies is that infants believe that the
moral categories “good” and “mean” are extrinsic and graded kinds (Estes, 2003). This
type of representation would put moral categories somewhat closer to the children’s
representation of artifact kinds (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a) and some social categories
such as race and ethnicity (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009b). The representation of “good” and
“mean” would be extrinsic because category membership depends on more contextual
factors that can change over time (e.g. the social context), and it could be graded because
people may be “mean” and “good” at the same time to some extent. It has been shown
that infants can take into account contextual factors when evaluating sociomoral actions.
For example, although infants prefer to interact with prosocial over antisocial agents, they
also prefer antisocial agents who harm dissimilar others (Hamlin, et. al, 2013). Thus, they
know that being “mean” or “nice” depends on the previous history of the characters
involved. However, as artifacts and some social categories “good” and “mean” could still
be considered kind-based representations for at least two reasons. First, because nonobservable properties are more identity-determining than observable properties (e.g. the
external appearance or patterns of motion). Second, because being “mean” or “nice”
could be properties of kinds of individuals, meaning that they are represented as
properties of an unlimited group of people (Prasada, 2012). Study 1 supports this
interpretation because those experiments suggest that the possession of specific moral
dispositions rather than external similarities or perceptual differences in motion drive the
infants’ numerical expectations. In the same line of reasoning, Study 2 also supports this
interpretation because internal non-obvious properties are more reliable indicators of
moral category membership than external properties. The main difference between the
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first and the second interpretation of these findings is that infants may represent moral
kinds as relative rather than absolute categories.
Which of these options is better supported by the developmental literature? Some
studies about the understanding of personality traits indicate that adults represent some
personality traits (e.g. shy, cold, talkative) as discrete categories, immutable, and
biologically rooted (Haslam, et al., 2004). For example, in the case of “shyness” adults
believe that people “either have this characteristic or they don’t and “it is not easy to
change”. On the other hand, studies with preschool-aged children suggest that around 4
years of age personality traits like “mean” and “nice” have inductive potential (Heyman
& Gelman, 2000). However, they are inductively less powerful than social categories
(e.g. ethnicity), children do not believe that they are biologically rooted, and essentialist
beliefs about personality traits are less coherent in young that in older children.
Accordingly, some researchers have suggested that the representation of personality traits
like essentialized natural kinds (e.g. objective and intrinsic) could emerge in adulthood as
a result of exposure to biological theories in the school. Therefore, younger children and
infants may have a less essentilized representation of personality traits, including “mean”
and “nice”.
Another reason by which we could be skeptical about a strong interpretation of
the current set of findings in terms of natural kinds is because the people’s moral
dispositions tend to vary as a function of the social context. For example, being “mean”
or being “nice” are dispositions relative to the recipient of those actions (e.g. a person
could be “mean” and “nice” at the same time with different people). By contrast, the
category membership of an animal does not change as a function of the context.
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Therefore, if infants represent moral dispositions as extrinsic kinds, they may allow for
some flexibility in the attribution of different dispositions to different individuals, but
they may still be identity-relevant properties (see Pomiechowska, Tatone, & Csibra,
2016).
Regardless of whether infants represent sociomoral categories as intrinsic or
extrinsic kinds the current set of studies provide two new insights about the origins of
sociomoral reasoning. First, around the start of the second year of life infants believe that
individuals display a coherent set of sociomoral behaviors in a particular context (e.g.
toward the same character). When infants detect two opposite sociomoral behaviors in a
featural and spatiotemporally ambiguous situation they are biased to represent two
different individuals. Second, the heavier weighing of internal over external properties of
social agents in Study 2 may signal the beginnings of essentialist reasoning of sociomoral
dispositions and social categories observed in older children and adults. Despite
differences in external appearance infants may believe that something intrinsic is more
determinant of the type of agent that they observe.
Several other issues deserve further investigation in the future. First, to what
extent do infants’ representations of sociomoral categories have inductive potential? A
characteristic feature of essentialized kinds is that knowing the category membership of
an object allows people to infer new properties of that object. For instance, knowing that
an animal is a mammal allow people to infer that is “warm-blooded” and produce milk. It
has been shown that 4-year-olds believe that “mean” and “nice” categories have more
inductive potential than the person’s appearance. If infants have a similar intuition they
may be able to infer that “nice people” tend to share behaviors and preferences among
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them. They also may infer that “nice” or “mean” people will be relatively consistent in
their intentions and behaviors across different situations. For example, if infants believe
that a prosocial individual has an underlying positive motivation to help others, they may
predict a wide range of prosocial behaviors in diverse situations. A second research
question has to do with differences in the conceptualization of prosocial and antisocial
behavior. In particular, are both sociomoral categories, “good” and “mean”, equally
essentialized in infancy? Some previous studies with older children suggest that positive
personality traits could be more strongly essentialized than antisocial behavior
(Diesendruck & Lindenbaum, 2009). Thus, children believe that positive traits (e.g. being
sociable) are more stable over time and across situations than negative traits (e.g. being a
loner), which could indicate that positive traits are more essentialized than negative traits.
Therefore, positive traits could be conceptualized as an essential part of “human nature”.
Future research should clarify if this intuition emerges even earlier in infancy. A third
open question has to do with whether infants can individuate agents based on other social
dispositions besides sociomoral behavior. Agents are engaged in multiple types of social
interactions and some of them are salient for infants early on. For example, infants are
able to distinguish chasers from chasees (Rochat, Striano, & Morgan, 2004) and
dominants from subordinates (Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith & Carey, 2011). The
extent to which infants represent different types of social roles as identity markers has not
been previously explored.
Finally, although in psychology the notion of essentialism has been traditionally
connected to the distinction of kinds from non-kinds, it is still unclear the extent to which
children and infants represent sociomoral behaviors as a property of a general kind, rather
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than a property of an individual. Traditional explanations of the process of object
individuation in both psychology (Xu & Carey, 1996) and philosophy (Hirsh, 1982)
invoke the construct ‘kinds’ or ‘sortal kinds’ (Xu, 2005) to explain how people keep track
of different objects over time by using conceptual distinctions that apply to groups of
individuals. While our interpretation of the current results follows this framework, an
alternative possibility worth considering is that the current results reflect only infants’
attributions of stable sociomoral behaviors to specific individuals without any
commitment to kind-based representations. Future research should help clarify this issue
by testing whether different looking individuals who share the same sociomoral
disposition are more likely to be represented as one object, just as infants are biased to
represent an instance of a red mug and a blue glass as a single individual belonging to the
kind-category ‘cup’ (Xu, et. al., 2004).
Overall, the two studies presented here suggest that between 11 and 14 months of
age infants conceptualize sociomoral dispositions as a central component in the identity
of intentional agents. From a young age we seem biased to represent “good” and “mean”
dispositions as relatively stable over time, qualitatively different each other, and based on
the attribution of internal properties.
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APPENDIX A
PICTURES STIMULI STUDY 1

Study 1: Baseline 2 Objects

Study 1: Hindering Action
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Study 1: Test Trial 2 Objects

Study 1: Open Condition Experiment 3
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APPENDIX B
PICTURES STIMULI STUDY 2

Study 2: Hindering Trial
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Study 2: Insides Removed Condition

Study 2: Outsides Removed Condition

Study 2: Test Trial
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